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Advisor: Jesús Maŕın-Solano & Jorge Navas
Abstract
The right management of the resources has become one of the hottest topics in the
social debate. In order to give some insights on how to manage them correctly, we have
extended a switching natural resources model. A Piecewise Closed-loop Nash Equilibrium
differential game is studied, where agents decide the amount of the resource they extract
and when to switch to a new and more efficient technology. We investigate different models
introducing a renewable resource and then, they are extended under a more general utility
function. Interior solutions are analysed. Our results are simulated, and a sensitivity analysis
is performed to identify the effect of the renewable resource and the constant elasticity of
substitution on the relevant variables of the model.
Keywords: Optimal timing of switching; Markovian Strategies; Renewable and nonrenewable
resources; Differential games.
∗Acknowledgments. I would like to thank my supervisors Jorge and Jesús to reminder that I was not alone.
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1 Introduction
How to manage natural resources has become one of the most important problems for the
civilization. If we continue consuming nonrenewable resources a fast as we have done in the past,
we may be in trouble in the future. In a similar way, an incorrect management of renewable
resources can affect their survival. Oil, gas, fisheries, forests, etc., are examples of both kinds of
resources. Thus, a better understanding of the management of natural resources may help us for
a more efficient and responsible exploitation. Moreover, in many situations in Economics, the
timing of switching between alternatives and consecutive regimes is of important interest. One
could think in many real-life examples, such as when it is optimal to adopt a new technology
or to stick with the old one (Boucekkine et al., 2004), or when a country has to decide whether
or not to join an international agreement. These models are also used in order to study the
optimal management of natural resources (Boucekkine et al., 2013), or when to phase out capital
controls in a given economy as studied by Makris (2001). Consequently, all these changes are of
interesting utility in economics.
Will introducing a renewable resource, in contrast with the nonrenewable case, make indi-
viduals consume more quickly because they know that the resource will regenerate itself? Will
they exhaust the resource sooner, and consume more in total? Or on the contrary, will they
continue extracting for a longer period or shorter period of time? Will the agents change the
technology later because they are under a renewable framework? In this paper, we try to pro-
vide some answers to these questions by studying a differential game problem where agents can
switch between different regimes, under an infinite horizon. While there is a rich literature on
exogenous changes in regimes (see e.g. (van der Ploeg, 2017) and (Zemel, 2015)), there are few
papers focusing on the (endogenous) optimal timing of switching. Papers studying this last case
are Tomiyama (1985), Amit (1986) and Makris (2001) where one agent decides when to switch.
Furthermore, Long et al. (2017) analyze the interaction with two agents. In all these models, the
switching decision involves a trade-off, since such a change entails immediate costs and potential
future benefits. The decision makers now decide when to switch and how much to extract.
Previous work related to this is relatively recent. In Reinganum (1981), it is assumed that
firms adopt pre-commitment (open loop) strategies on when to adopt a new technology. Then,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) study when firms adopt preemptively a new technology to prevent
or delay adoption by their opponent (for a survey of the related literature see Long (2011)). In
the paper by Boucekkine et al. (2011), they analyze the trade-off between environmental quality
and economic performance using a differential game with two players where they may switch to
a cleaner technology that is environmentally “efficient” but economically less productive. In this
previous work, they paid attention to the open-loop Nash equilibrium. As Long et al. (2017)
argue, this requirement is too strong to explain when players should change to the new regime.
The only study to our knowledge that deals with the feedback effect in a player’s switching
strategies operating through the state of the system is the recent paper by Long et al. (2017). A
general differential game is developed with two players having two strategies. The first involves
an action that affects the evolution of the state equation (how much to extract). The second
concerns the timing of switching between alternatives and consecutive regimes. The novel part
of the previous paper lies in the existence of some sort of feedback in player’s switching strategies
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operating through the state of the system (the resources left at that time). The authors develop
the necessary conditions for the general framework. They define a new concept (and therefore
a new methodology) in differential games, the Piecewise Closed-loop Nash Equilibrium (PCNE
hereafter). Notice that the researchers analyze a non-renewable case. For this reason, here, we
introduce a renewable resource. Moreover, we proceed with a further extension and the utility
function is modified to a more general one, where the logarithmic case is a particular case. We
analyze how the decision makers react to the mentioned modifications.
In the present work, we analyze a renewable resource, following the work by Long et al.
(2017) where a nonrenewable resource is studied. In addition, we are also interested in how the
agents react when their constant elasticity of substitution changes. For that reason, building
upon the mentioned paper, we extend it for the renewable resources and with a more general
utility function. Therefore, the mentioned changes in the structure of the model, may allow us
to a better understanding of the management of the natural resources. These contributions are
developed in Sections 3 and 4.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the paper by Makris (2001)
and Long et al. (2017), which have been fundamental in order to develop the mathematical
techniques that will be used in this paper. The optimal control problem (one decision maker)
is developed first, and then we explain the differential game problem. Section 3 studies how to
manage a nonrenewable resource where both player have a CES utility function. Moreover, a
simulation is performed to the analyze how the players react under this framework. Additionally,
the study of how the introduction of a renewable resource affects the behavior of the players is
shown in Section 4. This section is divided for the case of the logarithmic and the CES utility
function. In the latter case , we perform a simulation of the model and a an extensive study of
the sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes and points out the directions for further
research. Further mathematical developments can be found in the Appendix.
2 Previous Models
In this section, we present what have been studied in the past. Firstly, we expose the ideas
by Makris (2001) for an optimal control problem, and then we present the differential game
analyzed in Long et al. (2017). Hence, before we get into the differential game itself, let us
study a particular case. Such a case is determined when the set of decision makers consists of
a single element, one player, N = {1}, where N is the set of players. Thus, the “Differential
Game” is called an optimal control problem in this particular case.
In order to achieve such a goal, in this section we will follow the ideas firstly introduced by
Tomiyama (1985) and Amit (1986) to solve a finite horizon two-stage optimal control problem.
The former is interested in an optimal investment decision of a firm whose capital goods face
delivery lag. As Tomiyama (1985) has shown, this is reducible to a two-stage optimal control
problem. The latter focuses on the problem of a producer who considers switching from a
primary to secondary petroleum recovery process. Consequently, the problem is defined as a
two-phase optimal control problem. In order to study the problems presented by Tomiyama
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(1985) and Amit (1986), both authors derive the necessary conditions for the finite horizon
two-stage optimal control problem.
However, as Makris (2001) justified, in many cases in economics, it seems more appropriate
to consider a problem with an infinite horizon. The author studied the problem of an infinite
horizon representative agent with an open economy interacting with the rest of the world through
the world capital market. The problem is defined with capital restrictions at the initial time
t = 0. The government can abolish capital controls from an instant t∗1 and on; t
∗
1 is such that
t0 ≤ t∗1 < ∞. Then, in such an economy, there are two stages. The first stage is defined for
t ∈ [0, t∗1) where capital controls are in place. The second stage t ∈ (t∗1,∞) describes the case
where the capital accounts are liberalized by the government. Therefore, in such a model, one
is interested in the optimal instant where the government will abolish the capital controls.
The goal of this section is to introduce the concepts used in the literature. We now focus
on the the two-stage optimal control problem, and we show the switching conditions, where
the programming horizon is infinite, t ∈ [0,∞). Makris (2001) developed such conditions, in
contrast to the ones presented in Tomiyama (1985) and Amit (1986) for the finite horizon.
Building upon the work by Michel (1982), Tomiyama (1985), Amit (1986) and standard opti-
mal control theory techniques, Makris (2001) presents a complete theory of necessary conditions
for an infinite-horizon discounted two-stages optimal control problem.






e−ρtF 1 (x(t), u(t)) dt+
∫ ∞
t1
e−ρtF 2 (x(t), u(t)) dt− Ω1 (t1, x(t1)) , (1)
where Ω1 (t1, x(t1)) is defined as e
−ρt1ω(x(t1)) and it can be interpreted as a cost from switching
regimes. In addition, ρ is the discount rate. The corresponding differential equation describing
the evolution of the state variable x(t) in both regimes is
ẋ =
{
f1(x(t), u(t)) if t ∈ [0, t1)
f2(x(t), u(t)) if t ∈ [t1,∞)
(2)
We will define s as the state of the system, in this optimal control problem, s = 1, 2, where
s = 1 corresponds to t ∈ [0, t1) and s = 2 corresponds to t ∈ [t2,∞). Moreover, ω(x(t1)) is a
real valued once continuously differentiable function. In the present paper, we will focus on the
interior solutions, meaning 0 < t∗1 < +∞. Therefore, the theorem in Makris (2001) is :
Theorem 1. Consider the problem described above. Then, for (x∗(t), u∗(t), t∗1), t ∈ [0,∞), to















We now expose a two-player differential game, N = {1, 2}. The problem is defined by the
instantaneous payoff function and the differential equation describing the evolution of the state
variable, which depends on the regime the system is in. Throughout this paper, we work with
a discrete finite set of regimes S, indexed by s. Each player will decide her strategy profile,
deciding how much to extract and when to change to the second regime (incuring in a lumpy
cost). We assume that each player can switch only once. The general analysis with any finite
number of switching is studied in Makris (2001). It can be seen, however, that the main difference
between the work mentioned above and Long et al. (2017) is that the latter studies an optimal
control problem with n > 1, which results in a differential game. If there were only a single state
s ∈ S, we would be working under the optimal control theory framework developed above. The
characteristic in Long et al. (2017) lies in the fact that the dynamic system can switch between
different states where the state variable renews itself and the study of a more general utility
function. For instance, in Long et al. (2017), a particular case is studied.
Let ti ∈ R++ be the regime change action for player i ∈ N , which means that she de-
cides when to move from her state 1 to 2. Making such a change, she incurs in a lumpy cost
Ωi (ti, x(ti)). In this paper, we will assume interior solutions, which means 0 < ti < tj < +∞.









F 211 (u1(t), u2(t), x(t)) e
−ρtdt+∫ ∞
t2
F 221 (u1(t), u2(t), x(t)) e
−ρtdt− Ω1 (t1, x(t1)) ,
(5)
where ρ is the discount rate. Observe how both agents have the same discount rate. If this were
not the case, a problem of time inconsistency would appear as De-Paz et al. (2013) studied. The




≡ ẋ = fs (u1(t), u2(t), x(t)) . (6)
The ”Strategy profile” is constructed by a set of two type of controls. This control set is
defined as Ci = {ui(t), ti}. A strategy consists of an action policy Φi, and a timing strategy θi,
for both players.
The action policy Φi is characterized by the actions each player chooses at every possible
state of the system, (x, s) ∈ R++ × S. Therefore, the action policy for player i is a mapping
Φi from the state space R++ × S to the set Rn, that is Φi : R++ × S −→ Rn. As far as the
timing strategy is concerned, we will need the following pedagogical example to understand its
meaning. Suppose player 1 knows that the other player (player 2) knows she is in regime 21
at a date τ ∈ [t1, t2), with a certain amount of resources left. This means that player 1 has
switched before at t1 ≤ τ . Therefore, as it is expected, player 2 will change at t2 ≥ τ . Knowing
this scenario, player 1 knows that the interval of time between when she has changed (t1) and
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when her opponent will change (t2) is a function not of the stock, but of the value of the stock
at which player 1’s regime change takes place (x(t1) = x1). Consequently, the timing strategy
for player i, given that s ∈ Si, is a mapping θi from R++×S to R+ ∪{∞}. Observe that in our
study case, interior solutions, the image of θi excludes {∞} ∪ {0}, due to if ti = ∞ or ti = 0
we would be studying corner solutions. Thus, the mapping is θi : R++ × S → R+. Each player
chooses her switching time taking the one of her opponent as given. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 1. The strategy vector and profile for both players are determined by the following
definitions.
• A strategy vector for player i is a pair ψi ≡ (Φi, θi), i = 1, 2.
• A strategy profile is a pair of strategy vectors (ψ1, ψ2).
• A strategy profile (ψ∗1, ψ∗2) is called a piecewise closed-loop (Nash) equilibrium (PCNE),
if given that player i adopts the strategy vector ψ∗i , the payoof for the other player j is
maximized by the strategy vector ψ∗j , such that i, j = 1, 2.
Definition 2. The game of this paper is defined as G ≡ (N, (ψi)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N ) which is played
∀t, and N is the non-empty set of players. Ui is a real function, defined on
∏
i∈N ψi ≡ ψ ∀i ∈ N .
Assume that there exists a solution (u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t), x
∗(t)) to the differential game explained
before for a given set of switching time (t1, t2). We define the present value Hamiltonian for a
player i ∈ N as Hsi = F 111 (ui(t),Φ−i(x(t), s), x(t)) e−ρt+λsif s (ui(t),Φ−i(x(t), s), x(t)), for every
state where λsi is the co-state variable, evaluated at the solution denoted by H
s∗
i . Similarly to
what we have explained for the optimal control problem in the previous section, when the set
of decision makers is N = {1, 2}, the optimal conditions are given by the next theorem
Theorem 2. The necessary optimality conditions for the existence of a PCNE for the switching











= λ222 (t2 (7b)
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As we mentioned before, we next review the nonrenewable resource model proposed in Long
et al. (2017), in order to introduce some extensions to both, the utility function and the differ-
ential equation, that defines the state of the resource. Then, we modify the utility function for
the nonrenewable case. Most articles in the literature, do not take into account the possibility
of switch for players. Moreover, it is normally assumed that consumption is a fixed fraction of
the extraction level. The authors of the previous paper consider that players can adopt a new
technology whenever they decide. Therefore, both players will decide their consumption and
when to adopt the more efficient technology.
The following differential game consists of two players. Let ui(t) denote the consumption rate
for both players in any regime. Furthermore, the extraction rate from the resource is defined as
ei(t). The amount of resource both players have drawn is converted into consumption according
to the following technology: γiui(t) = ei(t), where γ
−1
i is a positive number that defines the
efficiency in transforming the extracted resource into consumption.
The efficiency of the technology is given by the parameter γi available to player i from t = 0
onwards. Due to the fact that players may have different technologies, we need to differentiate
between the technologies in the different states. Player 1 starts with technology l = 1, and has
to decide when to change to the technology l = 2. For player 2 instead, we use the label k.
The technological state is defined therefore as s = lk, ∀l, k = 1, 2, which shows what technology
each player is using. The parameters satisfy γ1i > γ
2
i . This inequality means that the second
technology is more efficient. When the ratio
γ2i
γ1i
∈ (0, 1) is smaller, the higher the gain.
The initial stock at t = 0 is given by x(0) = x0. As we mentioned above, t1 and t2 are the
switching times. Besides, we focus on the interior solutions (0 < t1 < t2 < +∞). The evolution
of the stock is given by the following differential equation
ẋ =

−γ11u1 − γ12u2 if t ∈ [0, t1)
−γ21u1 − γ12u2 if t ∈ [t1, t2)
−γ21u1 − γ22u2 if t ∈ [t2,∞)
(9)
When the players decide to change to a new regime, they incur a cost that is defined in
terms of the level of the state variable at which the adoption occurs, x(ti) = xi. We define such
a cost as ωi(x(ti)) with ω
′
i(.) ≥ 0. It takes the form ωi(xi) = χi + βixi, where χi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0.
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χi is the fixed cost related to the technology investment and reflects for instance, the outlay for
machinery. Moreover, βi reflects the sensitivity of adoption cost to the level of the resource left
at the instant player i decides to switch. One assumption is that such a cost is increasing in xi.
The idea behind this is that when the resource is scarce, the cost of adopting a new technology
is lower. This reflects the fact that the scientific progress related to the installation of new
technology to save on the extraction of resources is more intense, as the scarcity becomes more
acute. The switching cost is discounted at rate ρ. That means, that if the switch occurs at ti,
the discounted cost is e−ρtiωi(xi), that is defined in the Theorem as Ωi(ti, x(ti)). The general
game G is described as a sequence of three subgames, 11, 21 and 22. Therefore, the whole game
G is solved backwards. Hereafter, this definition will be used in the following sections.
We restrict our attention to linear feedback strategies uj ≡ Φj(x(t), s) = asj + bsjx(t). After a
tedious computation, we obtain that player’s extraction strategies are the same for all regimes 1
γliΦi(x(t), s) = γ
k
j Φj(x(t), s). (10)
This means that both players will extract exactly the same amount of resource. Therefore,
the extraction rates under regime s = 22 are given by
γ2i Φi(x(t), 22) = γ
2
jΦi(x(t), 22) = ρx(t). (11)











+ ρx(t) = Γ(x2) + ρx(t), (12)
where Γ(x2) =
ρ2β2(x2)2
1−β2ρx2 . The switching point for player 2 is given by the solution x2 of the
following equation, that has been obtained combining the equations for player 2 in the Theorem






= ln(1− β2ρx2). (13)
This equation shows the optimal moment of switching x∗2, and it is independent from the
switching time of player 1. Using the consumption expression given by eq. (12), and solving the
differential equation with the boundary condition x(t∗1) = x
∗
1 we obtain the expression for the
















1In the next sections, we develop the computations of the extensions proposed in Long et al. (2017).
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Evaluating this equation at t2 and solving for the timing of waiting of player 2 after player
















Remember that this represents the time-to-go, that is the waiting time between when player
1 has switched and when player 2 decides to switch. Observe, how the above equations define
the behavior of player 2 as a function of what player 1 would do. The results have been derived
using Theorem 2 for player 2. Now, we write the equations needed to define the behavior of
player 1. Let us define
ξ(x1;x
∗
2) = 1− θ′2[Γ(x∗2) + ρx1]e−ρθ2 ln(1− ρβ2x∗2)− β1[Γ(x∗2) + ρx1]. (16)
Notice in this case that θ′2[Γ(x
∗
2) + ρx1] = 1/2, where θ
′




1(t1) at time t1,
and solving for the Markovian strategies in regime s = 11 we obtain
γ11Φ1(x, 11) = γ
1
2Φ2(x, 11) =
Γ(x∗2) + ρx1[1− ξ(x1;x∗2)]
ξ(x1;x∗2)
+ ρx(t) = Λ(x1;x
∗
2) + ρx(t). (17)






+ ρω1(x1) = e
−ρθ2 ln(1− ρβ2x∗2) + ln [ξ(x1;x∗2)] . (18)
Equation (18) characterizes player 1’s switching point x∗1, which is independent of t2. At the





determined above, the switching time for player 1, t1 = θ1(x0, 11), is given by









In this section, we have seen how Long et al. (2017) obtained analytically the expressions
for the relevant variables of the game. In order to make it easier for the reader, to understand
the true meaning of them, we will perform a simulation for each model we develop.
Simulations
9
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2 ρ χ1 χ1 x0
Values 0.001 0.01 2 1.11 2 1 0.04 1 10 10000
Table 1: Values for the simulations.
Out[3559]=







g11u11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
g21u21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
g22u22(t ) t2 < t < 60
(a) e1 = e2 when t1 < t2
Out[3573]=







u11P1[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P1[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P1[t ] t2 < t < 60
u11P2[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P2[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P2[t ] t2 < t < 60
(b) u1 and u2 when t1 < t2 when t1 < t2
Figure 1: Evolution of the extraction (above) and consumption rate (below) at the PCNE.
Using the values given in Table 1 for the simulations 2, we can plot the behavior for the
extraction rate and the consumption in each state as a function of time. Derived from the
equations above and observing the graphics, one can notice that the extraction rates are the
same for both players in each state, but, unsurprisingly, different consumption rates, due to the
players having different efficient technologies. The optimal response of the agents is determined
in the Table 2:
x1 x2 θ2(x
∗
1, 21) t1 t2
Values 6,193.14 352.686 34.04 4.8 38.8
Table 2: Optimal response of the agents.
Intuitively, from Fig. 1b one can see how the consumption rate for player 1 (who has changed
first) is higher obviously, due to her changing to a more efficient technology first. Player 2 is
consuming less with a lower γ compared to player 1. Player 1 is consuming more extracting
2The parameters are given in Long et al. (2017), but we modify γ21 = 1.715 to the new γ
2
1 = 1.11 in this paper.
This change is motivated to achieve solutions in the model with renewable function. Observe how with a smaller
γ21 , player 1 becomes more efficient than with the parameters in Long et al. (2017).
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less, and player 2 is consuming less due to she now is extracting less (this is an obvious result
because player 2 keeps the same technology.). For that reason, the extraction rate decreases,
where the effect of the diminished γi prevails over the increase extraction rate effect. Observe
the small downwards jump in the extraction rate in Fig. 1a at t2. The intuition behind this
behavior, is explained as follows: With the new technology, the player needs less resources to
produce a given amount of the consumption. The other face of the same coin is shown in Fig.
1b, where player 2 jumps onward. This piecewise change is explained by the fact that now she
can extract more (otherwise, she would not make the switch).
Why player 1 has switched dramatically onward at t1? As player 1 knows that she will be
worse off after player 2 changes to the new technology at t2 (due to the downward jump we have
already explained), she will decide to compensate that cost before, at t1. This may induce her
to compensate this future anticipated costly change by increasing the extraction rate at t1 . As
depicted in Fig.1, even with a decrease of extraction, player 1 can consume much more at t1 due
to to her being more efficient now, and with less extraction, she can consume much more. This
will be compared in Section 4.2.
As it has been mentioned above, the switching strategies are defined by eq. (13) and (18).
Furthermore, eq. (15) defines the time-to-go before x1 has been defined. For that reason,
θ2(x
∗
1, 21) is a function of x1, that is the player 1’s switching point. Consequently, player 1 can
affect player 2’s switching strategies, and this influence will be taken into account by the former.
Note also that the waiting time for player 2 (after player 1 has switched), θ2(x
∗
1, 21), is increasing
in x∗1. This last result means that the larger the resource stock at t1, the later the adoption of
player 2. Intuitively, this means that when player 1 decides to switch promptly, player 2 tends
to delay the adoption of the new technology.
It is also worth seeing the evolution of the stock. This is shown in Fig. 2. Where the areas
below the function, is the amount of resources that have been consumed up to a period of time,
such that t ∈ R++. As far as sensitivity analysis is concerned, we leave it for the last section.
Out[3575]=








x11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
x21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
x22(t ) t2 < t < 60
Figure 2: Evolution of the resource.
In the next Sections 3 and 4, we extend the model analyzed by Long et al. (2017) to the case
first of a CES utility function, and latter with the introduction of a renewable resource. The
renewable extensions is analyzed first with a logarithmic and then with a CES utility function.
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3 A Differential Game with CES Utility under a Nonrenewable
Resource
This section extends the model presented previously towards a more general utility function.
The function is defined as a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) Utility Function. The
elasticity of substitution between two different periods in time is constant. Therefore, the utility





, ∀i ∈ N, s ∈ S. (20)
Which means that it is used for both players at each state of the game. The present value
































The FOCs are given by the maximum principle
∂Hsi
∂usi














ẋ = −γliusi (t)− γkj (asj + bsjx(t)) (22c)
As we proceeded previously, we solve the differential game backwards, i.e., we first study the
state s = 22, equivalent to the period of time t ∈ [t2,∞). For this purpose, we derive the results
from the HJB equation for both players. The FOCs have to be combined with the suitable
transversality conditions in each state. Remember that we could differentiate two type of states,
terminal or not. Solving (22), we conclude that player’s extraction strategies are the same for
every state
γliΦi(x(t), s) = γ
k
j Φj(x(t), s). (23)
See Appendix (A.1) for the development of the result. Observe, that if σ → 0, the result for
the logarithmic non-renewable part appears. As a result of (A-3), for the terminal state s = 22
we obtain
12
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γ2i Φi(x(t), 22) = γ
2




which means that both players consume the resource accordingly to this equation. With the




















3.1 Player 2’s switching problem
The goal of this subsection is to study the behavior of player 2. To achieve such a purpose,
we proceed as in the previous sections. As player 1 has switched at t1 ∈ (0,∞), there is an
amount of resources left x1. Using (22), (23) and knowing that s is a terminal regime, s = 22
































Knowing eq. (26b) and the value of γ12Φ2 at t = t2 we obtain the consumption strategy in

















































Time to switch Carles Manó Cabello
Therefore, here one can see how much both players are extracting in regime 21. From eq.





























This equation shows the optimal moment of switching x∗2, and it is independent of the switch-
ing time of player 1.
Replacing the consumption given by the expression (27) in the state equation, and solving
the resulting differential equation, with the condition x1 at time t = t1, one obtains the state
















One can check how when σ → 0, the same result is obtained when the logarithmic utility
is considered. Evaluating this equation at t2 and solving the timing of waiting of player 2 after
player 1 has switched θ2 = t2 − t1, we obtain
θ2(x
∗











which gives the time-to-go (before switching) strategy of player 2, as a function of the equilibrium
switching point of player 1, x∗1. This is the same interpretation of θ2(x
∗
1, 21) for all sections, but
obviously, θ2(.) will be different in each section.
3.2 Player 1’s switching problem
Now we take a step back to solve the problem of player 1. Player 2’s regime switching takes
place at some t2 ∈ (0,∞), with the amount of resource at period t2 defined as x(t∗2) = x∗2.
Making use of the Theorem (8a), (8b), and eq. (22), (24), (27) and (30) we obtain
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2) in eq. (31) and ξ(x1;x
∗
2) in eq. (32) are defined in the Appendix (A.3).
Knowing γ11u
1
1(t1) by (32) at the time t1, and solving for the Markovian strategies in regime




















This is now the consumption rate for both players when they are in regime 11. Making use


















+ρω1(x1) = ∑(x1, x∗2)+e−ρθ2Ψ(x∗2).
(34)
Equation (34) characterizes player 1’s switching point x∗1 which is independent of t2. At the
PCNE, it has to be evaluated for x2 and θ2(.), defined in (28) and (30), respectively.
Replace the extraction ui for both players into the expression Λ(x1;x
∗
2) + ρx(t), and then
plugging it into the state equation and solve the resulting differential equation with the condition
x(t0) = x0. Remember by eq. (23) that both players behave symmetrically in each state.
Particularly, at s = 11, and using eq. (33), we obtain the following differential equation

















2σ−1 )dt [−2Λ(x1;x∗2)] dt
]
combined with the



















This equation reflects the evolution of the resource for the state s = 11. Evaluating eq.(35)
at the end of its state, which means at t = t1, the timing of switching for player 1 is defined as
15
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where it depends of the discount rate, elasticity of substitution, the resources available at the
beginning and when player 2 switches.
3.3 Simulations
Simulations for the non-renewable CES case is a particular case of the renewable CES model
in the next section. Working with the same parameters established in the previous sections,
(Table 1) we get the following results for the relevant variables presented in Table 3. The
evolution of the extraction and the consumption is shown in Fig. 3.
x1 x2 θ2(x
∗
1, 21) t1 t2
Values 5,613.55 471.864 18.2878 4.46117 22.749
Table 3: Optimal response of the agents under a CES Non-Renewable differential game.
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g11u11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
g21u21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
g22u22(t ) t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
(a) Extraction: e1 = e2 when t1 < t2
Out[172]=





u11P1[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P1[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P1[t ] t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
u11P2[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P2[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P2[t ] t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
(b) Consumption: u1 and u2 when t1 < t2 when t1 < t2
Figure 3: Evolution of the extraction (above) and consumption rate (below) at the PCNE.
In order to get the results from the simulations, we set σ = 0.2. This will be an increasing
function at a decreasing rate, similar to the logarithmic one. Under this scenario, we observe how
player 1 has changed slightly a little earlier (t1 = 4.46 < 4.8 = t
log
1 ), where the variables with log
16
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reflect the logarithmic case. The same analysis is performed as in previous sections. Player 1,
who has switched first, extracts more resource because she is more efficient (γ21 = 1.11 < γ
1
1 = 2).
At the timing of switching, t1, now player 2 consumes just a little bit more. She is less efficient
in comparison with player 2, but she tries to reduce the gap between her opponent. For that
reason, the gap is similar (a little bigger), to the logarithmic case. 3 As in the previous sections,
during the state s = 21, where player 1 is more efficient than player 2, the former consumes
more compared to the latter. It is also worth mentioning that the amount of resources left at
t2 is higher (x2 = 471.864 > 352.686 = x
log
2 ) in the CES non-renewable section. But in this
case, the reserves at t1 are lower, which means that there are less resources when player 1 has
switched (x∗1 = 5613.55 < 6193.14 = x
log∗
1 ). The following fact holds as before, where θ2(.) is an
increasing function of x1, which means that when player 1 switches and leaves more resources
available, player 2 will wait longer to change to the new regime. Under this framework, player
2’s time-to-go reduces to θ2(.) = 18.28 < 34.04 = θ
log
2 (.). See Appendix (A.2) for the evolution
of the resource.
The following section analyzes how the introduction of a renewable resource affect the be-
havioral of the players. As before, this scenario is studied under two utility functions.
4 Renewable Cases
Will individuals consume more quickly in this section due to the renewable natural resource?
Will they consume more? Can we expect the resource to last longer? In this section we try to
give some insights to the previous questions.
4.1 A Differential Game with Logarithmic Utility under a Renewable Re-
source
We now are interested on how a renewable resource affect the behavior of the players for the
logarithmic case. To achieve that, we introduce a renewable function to the differential equation
of the form
ẋ = rx(t)− γliusi (t)− γkj usj(t). (37)
As we proceeded in the previous sections, we study the linear feedback strategies. The






rx(t)− γliusi (t)− γkj (asj + bsjx(t))
)
. (38)
3If player 2 would have jumped downward, she would increase even more the gap.
17
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The FOCs are given by the maximum principle 4
∂Hsi
∂usi







λsi (r − γkj bsj)
]
(39b)
ẋ = rx(t)− γliusi (t)− γkj usj(t) (39c)
Using the same guessing for the HJB equation than in the section without the removable
function, we obtain the same extraction strategies as in (10) (see Appendix (A.4)).
γliΦi(x(t), s) = γ
k
j Φj(x(t), s). (40)
The extraction rate, for state s = 22 is given by
γ2i Φi(x(t), 22) = γ
2
jΦi(x(t), 2) = ρx(t). (41)
which is the same extraction rate than under the nonrenewable case for the last regime. With















4.1.1 Player 2’s switching problem
In this subsection, we use the Theorem 2, to determine the behavior of player 2. Making use



















By the same Theorem 2, but now with eq. (7b) , one obtains the same condition as with
non-removable differential equation
4For a rigorous study of the derivations of the FOC see Sydsæter et al. (2008) and Wlde (2008).
18







2 at the value t2, and u
21












+ ρx(t) = Γ(x2) + ρx(t). (46)








(ρx2β2) = ln(1− β2ρx2). (47)
This equation defines the optimal level of switching, x∗2, which is independent of the switching
time of player 1. For a relationship between r and x2, see Appendix (A.5).
Replacing consumption with the eq. (46) in the differential equation, and solve it for the
boundary condition x(t∗1) = x
∗










 e(r−2ρ)[t−t1] + 2ρ2β2(x∗2)2
(r − 2ρ)(1− β2ρx∗2)
. (48)
Evaluating this equation at t2 and solving for the timing of waiting for player 2 after player








(r − 2ρ)(1− ρβ2x∗2)x∗1 − 2ρ2β2(x∗2)2
(r − 2ρ)(1− ρβ2x∗2)x∗2 − 2ρ2β2(x∗2)2
]
. (49)
4.1.2 Player 1’s switching problem
Following the same philosophy as before, player 2’s regime switching takes place at some
t2 ∈ R++, with the amount of resource at period t2 defined as x(t∗2) = x∗2. Making use of (8a)
(8b) from the Theorem 2, and eq. (39), (41), (46) and (49) one can obtain
19























































− β1[Γ(x∗2) + ρx1] (52)
Observe that Γ(.) is defined in this model by eq. (46), and θ′2[Γ(x
∗
2)+ρx1] ≡ ∂θ2/∂x∗1[Γ(x∗2)+
ρx1] = 1/2 as we obtained in the non-renewable section. Solving for the Markovian consumption
strategies in regime s = 11, one finds
γ11Φ1(x, 11) = γ
1
2Φ2(x, 11) =
Γ(x∗2) + ρx1[1− ξ(x1;x∗2)]
ξ(x1;x∗2)
+ ρx(t) = Λ(x1;x
∗
2) + ρx(t). (53)
which determines the consumption rate for both players at regime 11. An interesting detail
to keep in mind is that we have made the necessary manipulations to make it look like the
non-renewable model, although the expressions themselves are completely different. Notice that
Λ(x1;x
∗
2) is different due to ξ(x1;x
∗
2) is different. Substituting u
11
1 (t1) with the expression in











































Eq. (54) characterizes player 1’s switching point x∗1 which is independent of t2. Replacing the
extraction ui, for both players with the expression Λ(x1;x
∗
2) + ρx(t), and then plugging it into
the state equation and solve the resulting differential equation with the condition x(t0) = x0.
Remember that both players play symmetrically in each state. Particularly, at s = 11 we use
eq. (53).
20
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ẋ = rx(t)− Λ(x1;x∗2)− ρx(t)− Λ(x1;x∗2)− ρx(t)


























Evaluations eq.(55) (which shows the evolution of the resource at the first regime) at the
end of the state s = 11, which means at t = t1, we obtain the switching time for player 1














This section analyses the effect of the renewable function on the values of the important
variables of the model. We base this analysis in the frameworks presented before (with the same
values as in Table 1 ) but now observe that r > 0. In this case we set r = 0.03, which means that
the resource renews itself by three percent each period. Under this framework, the behavior for
the extraction is given in the Table 4. 5
x1 x2 θ2(x
∗
1, 21) t1 t2
Values 8,651.09 533.108 49.057 1.597 50.65
Table 4: Optimal response of the agents.
Under the renewable framework, one can easily see how player 1 switches earlier (t1 = 1.597)
compared to the model without renewable function (tnr1 = 4.8). Both players continue extracting
the same at each state, but as in the section with a nonrenewable recourse with a logarithmic
utility, they have different consumption rates, due to both players have different technologies at
each state. Player 1, who has switched first, extracts more resource because she is more efficient
(γ21 = 1.11 < γ
1
1 = 2). At the timing of switching, t1, player 2 consumes less, due to her moving
downwards (she is less efficient compared to player 1). During the state s = 21, where player 1 is
more efficient than player 2, the former consumes more compared to the latter. It is also worth
5We have written the code of the model in Mathematica in order to see how it reacts to a change in a
parameter.
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Out[3715]=








g11u11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
g21u21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
g22u22(t ) t2 < t < 60
(a) Extraction: e1 = e2 when t1 < t2
Out[3729]=








u11P1[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P1[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P1[t ] t2 < t < 60
u11P2[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P2[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P2[t ] t2 < t < 60
(b) Consumption: u1 and u2 when t1 < t2 when t1 < t2
Figure 4: Evolution of the extraction (above) and consumption rate (below) at the PCNE.
mentioning that the amount of resources left at t2 is higher (x
∗
2 = 533.108 > 352.686 = x
∗nr
2 )
in the renewable section as well as the reserves at t1 (x
∗
1 = 8, 651.09 > 6, 193.14x
∗nr
1 ). This is
determined by the introduction of a new resource, a self-generated one. One may be wondering
why this resource is exhausted when t→∞. To study that, one should ensure that the equation
of the resources at s = 22 converge to some α ∈ R++, and therefore, it would be stable. The
condition for this to happen is determined by the exponential part (r − 2ρ).
• If (r > 2ρ), therefore x22∗(t) explodes, and the resource would be infinite.
• If (r < 2ρ), x22∗(t) will be exhausted when times tends to infinite, but latter than in the
case with r = 0
• If (r = 2ρ), one may think that the resource will stay at x∗2 forever. Under this frame-
work, there is a big problem, the model cannot be solved. The first stone on the road is
determined by the time-to-go for player 2. When (r = 2ρ), there is not a direct value, and
therefore one should apply l’Hopital rule. But the big problem arises, when we try to find
x∗1. Under this scenario, there is no solution. As a consequence of this big problem, we
get that there is no evolution of the resource in the state s = 11, nor the time to change
for player 1.
With all the above cases in mind, the most realistic scenario will be when (r < 2ρ), but very
slightly below. We will pay attention to this case in a few lines below, as it will present certain
peculiarities.
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But first, study the case analyzed before, where (r < 2ρ) but not very slightly below, where
r = 0.3. The same philosophy is used as in the section that shows the work by Long et al.
(2017). Player 1 is consuming more extracting less, and player 2 is consuming less because she
is extracting lees (and furthermore she is using the inefficient technology at s = 21). The same
behavior at t2 is observed for player 2 moving downwards.
6 The waiting time between the two
changes is longer in this model (θ2 = 49.057 > 38.839 = θ
nr
2 ), which affects player 2 to change
later (t2 = 50.65 > 38.83 = t2 ), even if the player 1 has changed her technology quickly. The
evolution of the stock under the (r < 2ρ) case is shown in Fig. 5
Out[3704]=








x11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
x21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
x22(t ) t2 < t < 60
Figure 5: Evolution of the resource under a renewavle framework with r=0.3.
Observe how now, not surprisingly, both players could extract more resource due to the fact
that the resource is self-generated.
As mentioned earlier, it does not seem reasonable for players to exhaust the challenge when
time tends to infinite. For that reason, if we simulate the model, when r = 0.079999999999999,
which is very close to r = 0.08, we obtain the results in Table 5
x1 x2 θ2(x
∗
1, 21) t1 t2
Values 10,000 1460.14 51.88 0 51.88
Table 5: Optimal response of the agents for a r close to 0.08.
Out[782]=





u11P1[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P1[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P1[t ] t2 < t < t2+ 0.5 t2
u11P2[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P2[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P2[t ] t2 < t < t2+ 0.5 t2
Figure 6: Evolution of the resource under a renewavle framework with r → 0.08−, lower bound
.
6See Section ?? for the intuition.
23
Time to switch Carles Manó Cabello
Observe that, trying to make the resource last as long as possible, we found a corner solution,
which is beyond the scope of the paper, because we are studying interior solutions. As one can
see, from t2 onwards, the function is almost parallel to the x-axis. The resource will disappear
at the time 4× 1015. See Appendix (A.6) for the evolution of the resource.
4.2 A Differential Game with CES Utility under a Renewable Resource
In this section we study how a more general utility function affects the behavior of both
players. Following the same philosophy that has been used throughout the paper, the present







rx(t)− γliusi (t)− γkj Φj(x(t), s)
)
. and using our linear feedback strat-







rx(t)− γliusi (t)− γkj (asj + bsjx(t))
)
(57)
The FOCs are given by the maximum principle
∂Hsi
∂usi











r − γkj bsj
))
(58b)
ẋ = rx(t)− γliusi (t)− γkj (asj + bsjx(t)), (58c)
As we proceeded previously, we solve the differential game backwards. Thus, we pay attention
to the state s = 22, equivalent to the period of time t ∈ [t2,∞). For this purpose, we derive
the results from the HJB equation for both players. The FOCs have to be combined with the
suitable transversality conditions in each state. Remember that we could differentiate two type
of states, terminal or not. Solving (58), we conclude that player’s extraction strategies are the
same for every state
γliΦi(x(t), s) = γ
k
j Φj(x(t), s). (59)
See Appendix (A.7) to the development of the HJB equation. Therefore, for the terminal
state s = 22, we obtain
γ2i Φi(x(t), s) = γ
k
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This is now the consumption rate for both players when they are at regime 22. Notice, that
if we set r = 0, we obtain the same result as in the non-renewable framework. With this result,


















Accordingly, using eq. (60) and the boundary condition x(t2) = x2, the evolution of the







4.2.1 Player 2’s switching problem
Now, we analyze the behavior of player 2, and her decision variables. As player 1 has switched
at t1 ∈ (0,∞) there is an amount of resources left x1. Using the FOC for this section, (60) and










































Knowing eq. (62b) and the value of γ12Φ2 at t = t2 we obtain the consumption strategy in
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− (rσ − ρ)x2
2σ − 1
.
















































This equation shows the optimal moment of switching x∗2, and it is independent of the
switching time of player 1.
Replacing consumption given by the expression (63) in the state equation, and solving the
resulting differential equation, with the condition x1 at time t = t1, one obtains the state variable
for any t ∈ [t1, t2)
x21∗(t) =
x∗1 − 2Γ(x∗2)(
r − 2 rσ−ρ2σ−1
)
 e(r−2 rσ−ρ2σ−1 )(t−t1) + 2Γ(x∗2)(
r − 2 rσ−ρ2σ−1
) . (65)
One can check how when σ → 0 , and r = 0, the same result is obtained when the logarithmic
utility with the non-renewable resource is considered. Evaluating this equation at t2 and solving














which gives the time-to-go strategy of player 2 as a function of the equilibrium switching point
of player 1, x∗1.
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4.2.2 Player 1’s switching problem
Player 2’s regime switching takes place at some t2 ∈ (0,∞), with the amount of resource at




2. Making use of the Theorem (8a), (8b), and eq. (58), (60), (63)

































2) in eq. (67) and ξ(x1;x
∗
2) in eq. (68) are defined in the Appendix (A.8).
Knowing γ11u
1


















































+ρω1(x1) = ∑(x1, x∗2)+e−ρθ2Ψ(x∗2).
(70)
Equation (70) characterizes player 1’s switching point x∗1 which is independent of t2. Replace
the extraction ui for both players into the expression Λ(x1;x
∗
2) + ρx(t), and then plug it into
the state equation with the condition x(t0) = x0.
Remember by eq. (59) that both players behave symmetrically in each state. Particularly,
at s = 11, and using eq. (69), we obtain the following differential equation





















2σ−1 )dt [−2Λ(x1;x∗2)] dt
]
combined
with the given value at t0
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r − 2 rσ−ρ2σ−1
]
+ 2Λ(x1;x∗2)[
r − 2 rσ−ρ2σ−1
] . (71)
Evaluations eq.(71) at the end of the state s = 11, what means, t = t1, we obtain the
switching time for player 1
t1 = θ1(x0, 11) =
1(









Observe how now the recovery factor appears in the equation explicitly and in the expression
Λ(x1;x
∗
2). Eq. (72) defines when player 1 switches to her second regime, and therefore, to the
regime s = 21 in the game.
4.2.3 Simulation and Sensitivity Analysis
Finally, we proceed to perform simulations and a sensitivity analysis under the umbrella of
the present model. Performing the simulations, the results of the relevant variables of the model
are shown in Table 7.








2 ρ χ1 χ1 x0 r σ
Values 0.001 0.01 2 1.11 2 1 0.04 1 10 10000 0.03 0.2
Table 6: Values for the simulations under the CES-Renewable model.
x1 x2 θ2(x
∗
1, 21) t1 t2
Values 4,061.13 648.275 21.0413 11.5476 32.5889
Table 7: Optimal response of the agents under a CES-Renewable differential game.
The same behavior described at Table 7 is shown in Fig. 7. It is worth showing the evolution
of the resource over the time horizon. This information is displayed in Fig. 8. As it was proved
by the equations, both players have the same extraction rate in each regime. This is easily seen
in Fig. 7a. However, they differ in their consumption shown in Fig. 7b as they have different γ
(technologies). In this scenario, both players decide to extract more, which means that player
2 consumes a little more, while player 1 consumes much more, due to she is now more efficient.
Slightly increasing the extraction rate for player 1, she benefits from a higher consumption.
The impact for player 2 after she has adopted the new technology at time t2 is positive (she
jumps upwards), or otherwise, she would never switch. As it was considered in Long et al.




2) ≶ 1, which is
unclear in general. This expression presents information on the magnitude and direction of the
adjustment of extraction (and the consumption for player 2, since she is still using the same
28
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g11u11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
g21u21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
g22u22(t ) t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
(a) Extraction: e1 = e2 when t1 < t2
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u11P1[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P1[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P1[t ] t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
u11P2[t ] 0 < t < theta1[x1]
u21P2[t ] theta1[x1] < t < t2
u22P2[t ] t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
(b) Consumption: u1 and u2 when t1 < t2 when t1 < t2
Figure 7: Evolution of the extraction (above) and consumption rate (below) at the PCNE for
the CES-Renewable differential game.
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x11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
x21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
x22(t ) t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
Figure 8: Evolution of the resource under the CES-Renewable differential game.
technology). This adjustment occurs when players move from regime 11 to regime 21. For this
reason (ξ(x∗1;x
∗
2)), both players jumped downwards in the previous section. Player 1 knows that
she will be worse off when player 2 decides to change, because she will endure the decrease in
extraction rates while she will not be able to compensate by changing his own technology again.
This explains why player 1 rewards herself by increasing the extraction rate at t1.
However, a question that has been hovering in this paper and, we now develop in this more
general model, is how player 2 chooses the switching point x∗2. According to eq. (64), she
equalizes the net marginal gain of adoption to the direct marginal switching cost (this is just
ρω2(x2)). Furthermore, eq. (66) verifies that the waiting time for player 2 before player 1 has
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switched, is defined in terms of the switching point of player 1, x∗1, and other parameters that
define regime 21. As we mentioned in the section with the nonrenewable resource with the
logarithmic utility function, player 1 affects the moment of change of player 2, and the former
will take this advantage into account in the first regime problem.
We now focus on a comparative analysis. Using this model as the most general one, it is
compared to the non-renewable model. For that purpose, Tables 3 and 7 should be compared.
Firstly, player 1 switches later compared to the CES model with the non-renewable resource
(t1 = 11.55 > 4.46 = t
nr
1 ), where the nonrenewable variables are denoted with nr. Then, player
2 decides to switch later under the renewable umbrella (t2 = 32.59 > 22.749 = t
nr
2 ). This
phenomenon is determined by the fact that player 2 waits longer to change, once player 1 has
already changed to regime 21 (θ2(.) = 32.59 > 22.749 = θ2(.)
nr). Comparing the switching
point for player 1, she decides to switch leaving less resources available (x∗1 = 4, 061.13 <
5, 613.55 = x∗nr1 ). Finally, player 2 decides to switch to regime 22, by making available an
amount of resources equal to (x∗2 = 648.275 > 471.86 = x
∗nr
2 ), which is more than with the
model presented in the previous section.
After performing this analysis, we proceed to study how sensible the model is. For this end,
we modify all the parameters, increasing and decreasing their values in the next table, showing
therefore, how the relevant variables are affected. These simulations should be compared with
the CES-renewable model presented in this section.
One can observe how sensible the model is when the renewable parameter is modified. When
this approaches to 0.08 from the left, player 1 and player 2 decide to switch really late. For
instance, player 1 switches 27 times later than under the model presented in the first row. 7
This answers one question in the introduction. Under this renewable resource, players decide to
extract more, due to the fact that the resource is auto generated, and they will enjoy more from
it than under a non-renewable framework. When player 1 is more sensible for the adoption cost
at the instant of switching (β1), she will decide to switch later leaving less resources available
for the rest of the game (which means that they have been consuming more at the first stage).
The same behavior is applied for player 2, but taking into account her variables. As far as the
analysis of the efficiency of the players’ technology is concerned, when player 1 is less efficient
at stage 11 (γ11 = 2.3) she will decide to switch earlier and enjoy the new technology. The same
philosophy is observed for player 2. On the contrary, when they become more efficient before
they change to the new technology (lower γ1), they will delay the moment of change, due to
the fact that the technology gap between the two regimes is lower now. Regarding the adoption
of their new technology, when they become more efficient in the future, obviously they want to
adopt it earlier.
Additionally, when the discount rate increases, that is, they do not consider the future so
much anymore, and when both players switch, they leave less resources than under the baseline
model, what means that they have consumed more. A remarkable fact is that player 1 does
not change her switching time much, while player 2 reduces it considerably (due to when player
2 switches, it is considered very distant in time from the perspective of t = 0). Moreover,
7We show the regular model presented in Table 7 in the simulation Table 8 to make the comparison easier for
the reader.
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x2 x1 θ2(.) t1 t2
Regular 648.275 4.061,13 21.041 11.547 32.5889
r =0,02 577.042 3,971.520 18.679 9.731 28.410
r=0,078 1.375,950 3.590,990 49.434 300.709 350.143
β1 = 0.003 648.275 1,213.060 6.987 26.448 33.436
β1 =0.0008 648.275 5,233.530 24.041 8.350 32.392
β2 =0.03 141.845 3,477.580 37,724 13,380 51.104
β2 =0.007 1,048.430 4,384.700 16,197 10,621 26.818
γ11 =2.3 648.275 5,343.390 24.288 8.141 32.428
γ11 =1.7 648.275 270.720 16.243 16.535 32.770
γ21 =1.3 648.275 1,379.000 8.451 25.342 33.782
γ21 =1 648.275 6,382.740 26.396 5.689 32.086
γ12 =2.3 863.882 4,584.830 18.618 10.103 28.721
γ12 =1.7 398.066 3,530.590 25.782 13.197 38.979
γ22=1.1 337.842 3,429.540 27.548 13.537 41.084
γ22=0.8 1,064.120 5,018.060 16.921 9.015 25.936
ρ =0.06 298.347 2,257.430 13.396 10.299 23.695
ρ =0.02 2,394.540 9,744.730 64.940 2.043 66.983
χ1 =2 648.275 3,846.700 20.401 12.281 32.682
χ1 =0.5 648.275 4,167.900 21.348 11.198 32.545
χ2 =15 505.983 3,534.410 22.981 13.182 36.163
χ2 =5 779.487 4,581.160 17.724 10.118 29.842
x0 =20000 648.275 4,061.130 21.041 25.051 46.093
x0 =8000 648.275 4,061.130 21.041 8.470 29.789
σ =0.25 838.409 7,531.830 21.186 3.073 24.259
σ =0.15 498.628 2,073.400 18.823 23.213 42.042
Table 8: Values of the relevant variables for different set of parameters.
analyzing the fixed costs related to the technology investment (χi, ∀i ∈ N), when it is bigger
for one player, such a player delays her moment of change. When the cost is lower, they decide
to change a bit earlier. Notice now how when the game starts with less amount of available
resource, both players decide to switch earlier, to be able to enjoy the few resources that remain,
extracting it more easily earlier. When both agents decrease their sigma, that means that they
prefer to smooth their consumption, as it is explained in Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004). The
greater the σ, the lower the desire to smooth consumption over time. For that reason, with
a lower σ, players 1 and 2 will change later, and therefore, they have consumed more in the
previous regimes.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has extended the basic model studied by Long et al. (2017) in several directions.
The role of the renewable resource has pointed out how the agents react to its introduction. Both
players have two types of strategies at their fingertips, which affect the strategies of the other
player. At each point in the game, players decide their actions that will influence the evolution
of the state equation. Furthermore, they decide on the timing of switching, which takes the
game to a new stage. Our models have been developed under the piecewise close-loop Nash
equilibrium (PCNE) technique, developed in the paper mentioned above, where the switching
strategy is a function of the state of the system, which means that both players decide when to
change taking into account the resources available.
The interaction that emerges from the game shows how one player’s decision to switch affects
the other player’s strategy and, in addition, the second player’s switching strategy will affect
the welfare of the first player. We have tried to give some insights to the questions formulated
in the introduction. For this purpose, we have computed numerically how the introduction of
a renewable resource affects the relevant variables of the model such as the timing of switching
(ti), the available resource at those moments (x
∗
i ), and how long the second player waits until
she decides to move to the last stage of the game (θ2(.)). The simulations of the proposed models
have shown that players enjoy higher consumption rates and stay in the regimes longer. This
is determined by the fact that the resource is self-generated and thus, it gives them the option
to extract more. A complete sensitivity analysis has been performed for each parameter of the
model. Therefore, both players enjoy a higher extraction rate and hence, higher consumption,
which is translated into a higher welfare under this kind of resource. This paper has been built
upon the work by Long et al. (2017), where the authors develop a new methodology called
PCNE for differential games with regime strategies. However, just interior solutions have been
analyzed. Wherefore, corner solutions will be considered in the future.
This paper is only the first step towards a more elaborate framework, where a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium model is introduced, with a generalization of the set of decision
makers to N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Future work will be based on the introduction of the climate change
problem, introducing emissions tax and transfer policies as in Hillebrand and Hillebrand (2018).
Moreover, in future research, a more complicate and general natural resources, with renewable
and nonrenewable resources model will be analyzed, to study how it affects the behavior of the
player. These players could be countries competing for a resource and how much to pollute.
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A APPENDICES
A.1
The result is driven from the guessing of the HJB equation. The guessing for the value
function ∀i ∈ N is: Vi(x) = Aix(t)
σ




σ−1. Therefore, the HJB becomes:






+ V ′i (x)
[
−γ2i u22i (t)− γ2j u22j (t)
]}
(A-1)





































Regrouping the terms with x, we get a system of non-linear equations that, through various








,∀i ∈ N (A-3)
Observe, that if σ → 0, the result for the logarithmic non-renewable part appears. As a
result of (A-3), for the terminal state s = 22, we obtain:
γ2i Φi(x(t), 22) = γ
2





The evolution of the resources along the CES non-renewable differential game is shown in
the Fig. (9)
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x11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
x21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
x22(t ) t2 < t < t2+ 0.2 t2
Figure 9: Evolution of the resource under non-renewable CES model.
A.3






2) in eq. (31) and ξ(x1;x
∗




































































and in eq. (A-7), θ′2 is given by
− −1 + 2σ
2
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A.4
The FOCs in Section 4.1 have to be combined with the suitable Transversality Conditions
in each state. Remember that we could differentiate two type of states, terminal or not. Solving
(39), we conclude that player’s extraction strategies are the same ∀s. After a tedious computa-
tion, we obtain that player’s extraction strategies are the same ∀s ∈ S:
γliΦi(x(t), s) = γ
k
j Φj(x(t), s) (A-8)




F (x(t), u22i (t)) + V
′
i (x(t)) · g(x(t), u22i (t))
}
(A-9)
that is: Vi(x) = Ai · ln(x(t))+Bi. The derivative to respect x of our guessing is V ′i (x) =
Ai
x(t) .








rx(t)− γ2i u22i (t)− γ2j u22j (t)
]}
(A-10)





, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
Plug u22i (t) into the HJB equation with the guessing, and we get:

















Regrouping the terms with x, we get Φi(x(t), s) ≡ u22i (t) =
ρx(t)
γ2i
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, for
the terminal state s = 22, we obtain :
γliΦi(x(t), s) = γ
k
j Φi(x(t), s) = ρx(t) (A-12)
A.5
The relationship between r and x∗2 is given by eq. (47). From this equation, we obtain the
amount of resource x2 at switching time t2. Solving the equation, the solution to x2 is given by:
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+ 2500r − 100
r − 0.04
(A-13)
Where W is the Lambert W function, also called the Omega Function or Product Logarithm
8.
The graphic representation of eq. (A-13) is shown in the Figure (10). As it can bee easily
seen, in order to get a coherent solution of x2, we set r = 0.03.
A.6
The evolution of the resources when r → 0.08− is shown in Fig. (11).
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x11(t ) 0 < t < theta1(x1)
x21(t ) theta1(x1) < t < t2
x22(t ) t2 < t < 10000000000000000
Figure 11: Evoluion of the resource after Player 2 has switched.
A.7
This result is driven from the guessing of the HJB equation. The guessing for the value
function ∀i ∈ N is: Vi(x) = Aix(t)
σ
σ . The derivative to respect x of our guessing is V
′
i (x) =
8For a further analysis of the Lambert function see Corless et al. (1996)
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Aix(t)
σ−1. Therefore, the HJB becomes (observe how the renewable part is introduced):






+ V ′i (x)
[
rx(t)− γ2i u22i (t)− γ2j u22j (t)
]}
(A-14)





































Regrouping the terms with x, we get a system of non-linear equations that, through various
















2) in eq. (67) and ξ(x1;x
∗














































































Notice that from eq. (68) we have renamed:
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2) in eq. (67) and ξ(x1;x
∗
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